

Dedicated to
FREDERICK FRANCIS PETERSEN
(1923–1979)



Having already been exposed to asbestos by his employer prior to enlisting in the United States Navy on 9 December 1942 at the age of nineteen, Frederick participated in combat actions in North Africa, Sicily (July 1943), Salerno (September 1943)—where he received two citations for bravery—and in Normandy (June 1944), where he participated in the assault on Omaha Beach. After surviving four amphibious landings in the European Theater, the Navy decided they could use his expertise in the Pacific Theater. Amphibious landings at Leyte in the Philippines (October 1944), Iwo Jima (February–March 1945), and Okinawa (April–June 1945) brought Frederick's total to seven. Having fought German, Italian, and Japanese fascism without receiving so much as a scratch, Frederick returned to the home he defended only to prematurely die an extremely painful Asbestosis death and leave his widow to compel the industrial perpetrators through the courts to assume responsibility.

Contributors:

Jerzy Aleksandrowicz
E&Y Poland

COL (Ret.) Mirosław Banasik
Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland

Dr. Jānis Bērziņš
Latvian Defence College

BG (Ret.) Hans Damen
INSPARCOM Strategy and Logistics

Dr. Michael D. Evans
Concept Materials, Inc.

LTG (Ret.) Frederick Benjamin Hodges
former Commander of United States Army Europe

Charles Preston Long
Centre for the Study of New Generation Warfare


Gregory King Melcher
Chief of Operations, Centre for the Study of New Generation Warfare

Dr. Łukasz Przybyło
War Studies Academy, Poland

Introductions:

Dr. Łukasz Przybyło
War Studies Academy, Poland

Dr. Silvu Nate
Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania



PHILLIP A. PETERSEN

THE EASTERN FRONT
IN WORLD WAR 3
VOLUME I

TETRAGON



WARSZAWA

Editors:

Lukasz Przybyło
Tadeusz Zawadzki

Cover design:

Teresa Oleszczuk

Maps:

Tadeusz Zawadzki

DTP:

Wanda Zawadzka, Tadeusz Zawadzki

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kontakt@tetragon.com.pl

www.tetragon.com.pl

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Preface

*Happy is the country
in which the despicable
will at least be despised.*

*Nadezhda Mandelshtam*¹

This volume is the first of two. Volume 1 examines what is, in effect, a Third World War currently being waged between modern (cosmopolitan) and non-modern (traditional) socio-economic forces. Although this war against modernity is being led by Vladimir Putin, the decisive battlefield is within the United States. Since America is the indispensable leader of the liberal democratic world, Putin has attempted to forge a bond with that fraction of the American electorate “that has no respect for non-conformism, but is based upon a relentless demand for conformity.” To describe this fraction, Richard Hofstadter borrowed the term pseudo-conservative from the study of *The Authoritarian Personality* by Theodore W. Adorno:

(...) because its exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism in the classical sense of the word, and they are far from pleased with the dominant practical conservatism (...). Their political reactions express rather a profound if largely unconscious hatred of our society and its ways—a hatred which one would hesitate to impute to them if one did not have suggestive clinical evidence.

From clinical interviews and thematic apperception tests (...) the pseudo-conservative (...) shows “conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness” in his conscious thinking and “violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere (...). The pseudo-conservative is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them against

¹ Nadezhda Yakovlevna Mandelstam (1899–1980), was a Russian Jewish writer and educator, and the wife of the poet Osip Mandelstam who was murdered in 1938 in the Great Purge. She wrote two memoirs *Hope Against Hope* (1970) and *Hope Abandoned* (1974). Both books are masterpieces of prose and put an author at the centre of the liberal resistance against the Soviet rule over Russia.

more or less fictitious dangers, consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition.” Who is the pseudo-conservative, and what does he want? It is impossible to identify him by class, for the pseudo-conservative impulse can be found in practically all classes in society, although its power probably rests largely upon its appeal to the less educated members of the middle classes. The ideology of pseudo-conservatism can be characterized but not defined, because the pseudo-conservative tends to be more than ordinarily incoherent about politics.²

In orchestrating what has been described as *mobilizing passions*,³ Vladimir Putin has shaped what can increasingly be called fascist action by these American pseudo-conservatives. Successfully employing recently-emerged communication tools (primarily social-media), Putin has unleashed what Robert O. Paxton refers to as “emotional lava” to support his war to destroy America and the liberal democracies it leads.

At bottom is a passionate nationalism. Allied to it is a conspiratorial and Manichean view of history as a battle between the good and evil camps, between the pure and the corrupt, in which one’s own community or nation has been the victim. In this Darwinian narrative, the chosen people have been weakened by political parties, social classes, unassimilable minorities, spoiled rentiers, and nationalist thinkers who lack the necessary sense of community.⁴

Putin has elited a “mood” among a substantial proportion of the American masses and created a hierarchical order within this mass movement wherein one either participates in the hierarchy or accepts subordination as a member of the masses. In the United States, this social mobilization is driven by demands to expand the system from an elitist to a mass state.

2 Richard Hofstadter, “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt (1955),” in: *The Radical Right*, edited by Daniel Bell, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1964, pp. 76–77.

3 Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, New York: Vintage Books, 2005, pp. 219–220. Among this “mobilizing passions” Robert O. Paxton has included:

- 1)** a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of any traditional solutions;
- 2)** the primacy of the group, toward which one has duties superior to every right, whether individual or universal, and the subordination of the individual to it;
- 3)** the belief that one’s group is a victim, a sentiment that justifies any action, without legal or moral limits, against its enemies, both internal and external;
- 4)** dread of the group’s decline under the corrosive effects of individualist liberalism, class conflict, and alien influence;
- 5)** the need for closer integration of a purer community, by consent if possible, or by exclusionary violence if necessary;
- 6)** the need for authority by natural chiefs (always male), culminating in a national chieftain who alone is capable of incarnating the group’s historical destiny;
- 7)** the superiority of the leader’s instincts over abstract and universal reason;
- 8)** the beauty of violence and the efficacy of will, when they are devoted to the group’s success; and
- 9)** the right of the chosen people to dominate others without restraint from any kind human or divine law, right being decided by the sole criterion of the group’s prowess within a Darwinian struggle.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

As one part of the nation moves ahead and the other falls behind, an increasingly dual society and economy is created with the political system the major, but totally insufficient link between the two worlds. What results is a nation within a nation, isolated with its own rules and preoccupations, resentful of the modern sector and of its own conditions, ignored and despised in its turn.⁵

The resulting political mobilization of this minority alternative nation of largely Christian white supremacists is an expression of discontent in the less-educated lower middle class in which nationalism is exploited to glorify violence for its own sake as an attack upon the bourgeois virtues of compromise and the give and take of pluralistic society.⁶ Politics has increasingly become two intertwined conflicts between modernization and non-modernization and between classes, races, and religions as part of a global struggle that is characterized and explained in this first volume as war.

The follow-on to Volume 1 will address many of the operational-strategic and operational-tactical issues of the kinetic elements of Russian New Generation Warfare discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume. Volume 2 will focus on military geography and its impact on operational art, from the High North to the Baltic States and the north-east quadrant of Poland⁷ to Romania. It will also examine concrete aspects of movement within the European Theater of Strategic Military Action (referred to as a TVD by Russian General Staff planners) and the challenges of logistics within the three Strategic Directions comprising the European TVD.

Initially, these volumes were intended as a single integrated means by which to provide structure to a European-American Security Dialogue event in Romania. Its initial design also reflected a more traditional examination of kinetic operations in Russian

⁵ A.F.K. Organski, "Fascism and Modernization," *The Nature of Fascism*, edited by S.J. Woolf, New York: Vintage Books, 1969, p. 27. George Packer sees these two nations comprised of a narrative of "four Americas": "Free America," "Real America," "Smart America," and "Just America." The first two align mainly with the Republican Party and the last two with the Democrats, but each represents a different challenge to the liberal consensus that defined the political landscape during the Cold War and, in Packer's view, created a society with "more economic equality, more shared prosperity, and more political cooperation" than we have today. "All four narratives are also driven by a competition for status that generates fierce anxiety and resentment." In the vernacular of Donald Trump, Packer argues that "they all anoint winners and losers. In Free America, the winners are the makers, and the losers are the takers who want to drag the rest down in perpetual dependency on a smothering government. In Smart America, the winners are the credentialed meritocrats, and the losers are the poorly educated who want to resist inevitable progress. In Real America, the winners are the hardworking folk of the white Christian heartland, and the losers are treacherous elites and contaminating others who want to destroy the country. In Just America, the winners are the marginalized groups, and the losers are the dominant groups that want to go on dominating." George Packer, "How America Fractured into Four Parts," *The Atlantic*, July/August 2021, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/07/george-packer-four-americas/619012/>.

⁶ Forty percent of Republicans and Independents believe the violence against the United States Government (USG) is justified, meaning that the number of Americans ready to employ violence against the USG stands at one-third. Dan Balz, Scott Clement, and Emily Guskin, "Poll: Views of Capital riot split on party lines," *The Washington Post*, January 2, 2022, pp. A1 and A6.

⁷ See "Appendix 2: Detailed Terrain Assessment of Strategic Regions and Operation Axes" in *Baltic Security Net Assessment*, Tartu, Estonia: Baltic Defence College, January 2018, to get an idea of the operational focus of the Second Volume of this current initiative, <https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/BalticSecurityNetAssessment2018.pdf>.

military planning, even though it was intended to examine all nine elements of Russian New Generation Warfare—to include nonkinetic and nuclear elements. As the research for the book proceeded—and the Covid-19 Epidemic-induced postponements of the event allowed the time for much more of the story about Russia’s 2016 intervention in Brexit and the election of Donald Trump to the American presidency to emerge—the nonkinetic subjects in the volume continued to expand, reshaping the volume substantially. Truthfully, the study became something that original contributing Romanian colleagues, in particular, “did not sign on for.” This is, for me, precisely the point, however; while it might be necessary to begin with a framework for a study, the results of the research should always determine the conclusions reached. Intelligence analysts—whether working with open-source materials or those of the “burn before reading” category—have an intellectual obligation to follow where the evidence leads them. This is true, in my opinion, even when the materials reveal uncomfortable truths—perhaps, especially when the facts that emerge contradict conventional wisdom or touch politically sensitive matters. But beyond laying out the facts as they emerge, it is critical in my view to explain the relationships between those facts, as well as to explain—to the best of one’s ability—how these realities came to be.

Despite the rather dramatic reshaping of what became this volume, I have decided to keep some aspects of the original text despite their less critical role to the new narrative because they provide context that will be of value to the reader. For example, in Chapter 1, Greg Melcher and I (at the recommendation of Mirosław Banasik) decided to retain a section entitled “Post-Cold War Black Sea Security Initiatives” as evidence that the current tense Black Sea environment can be laid at the feet of those countries—Turkey and Ukraine—which should bear principal responsibility for allowing the situation to evolve the way it did. Had we not made the decision to retain this section we might, in a way, be contributing to the usual blame the aggressive Russians or the provocative Americans game. Ukrainian corruption promoted by Moscow, and the destruction of Kemalism—wherein the only Turkish institution truly committed to secular democracy was the military—by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, proved a toxic combination during a period when there was a genuine opportunity to extend the geographical boundary of Europe beyond the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Unfortunately, at the time only Georgia and Romania perceived this possibility, and the moment passed.

History is replete with “I didn’t know” excuses,⁸ but most of the time it’s simply either that people didn’t want to know the truth or that those truths were in one way or another inconvenient. This is precisely why I believe that it is the intelligence analysts’ responsibility to document both the “warnings” as well as the “warnings ignored.” I, myself, will forever be humbled by the fact that I stood silent at the podium in the Pentagon’s “tank” before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having had my briefing “gutted” by my Defense Intelligence Agency boss—Gordon Negus—and lacking the courage to explain why the

⁸ Examples are the failures of intermediate supervisors to forward analysts’ warnings and security Policy elites to accept Intelligence (and academic) warnings about the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the September 2011 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York City.

briefing that set NATO in disarray at Supreme Allied Commander Bernie Rogers' behest didn't seem so controversial. Understanding the forces that can tug at one's conscious when weighing what *might be* societal existential consequences against what *are the very real* personal and immediate consequences of truth-telling does not, however, make us less responsible to future generations for the consequences of our actions or inactions—neither for what my old co-author John Hines used to call “the willfully ignorant” who simply refuse to be moved by the weight of evidence against their threat or policy preference and do the bullying, nor those they successfully cowed.

For my entire professional life, I have approached the production of intelligence as involving “all source” work to ensure that the product was correct (and couldn't be attacked by opponents on the basis of “if you knew what I know” arguments) and the production of unclassified products (always taking into consideration the protection of sources that could be “at risk”) so that the knowledge gained from the research actually gets to, and may be employed by, the people who need it most—the operators. During this professional life, I have focused on “operational-strategic” issues: how is the Soviet/Russian General Staff organized; how does it organize its thought processes to reach professional conclusions regarding the organization and execution of operations; and how are the conclusions reflected in practical operations. But even the role of the Russian General Staff—and even that of the Russian Armed and Intelligence Forces—have changed in this current war of a new type, and this volume will explain these changes. This explanation relies, understandably, upon numerous Russian military sources as well as the research of many social scientists who have examined the populist political phenomenon, but also draws heavily upon many American conservative political commentators whose insight concerning the subversion of the Republican Party has proven critically important to a student of Soviet/Russian military theory. Contributors Greg Melcher and Łukasz Przybyło argued the importance, particularly for European readers who may not be familiar with the political leaning of many of the American political commentators whose insights are exploited in this volume—such as George F. Will and Max Boot—and be misled because their articles and commentaries are referenced in *The Washington Post*.⁹

Over the decades, I have been pleased to see how intelligence thinking (both inside and outside of government) moved from Order of Battle (“bean-counting”) to broader operational net assessments (probably reflecting the legacy of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment and its late director, Andrew Marshall).¹⁰ Even prior to meeting Andy Marshall,

⁹ *The Washington Post*, frequently denigrated by the political Radical Right as a “left-wing rag” strives to be “the” paper of the capital of the United States and, as a result, offers its pages to far more genuinely conservative authors than probably any other newspaper in the United States. Although I monitor numerous so-called news services of the Radical Right with names such as *Informing America* and *JustPatriots*, *The Epoch Times* which is affiliated with the Falun Gong new religious movement and promotes far right political figures in Europe and the United States is probably the most slickly produced, which is not surprising given the millions of dollars they have to spend. As much as *The Epoch Times* tries to present itself as promoting news that is factual and without bias, much of its content is focused on hard right spinning of the news and promotion of conspiracy theories that actively spread false information.

¹⁰ To anyone aspiring to a successful career in the intelligence community or military-strategic affairs of any nation (the Chinese claim to have translated every word that Mr. Marshall ever wrote),

however, I learned “the hard way” concerning the consequences of not starting with a proper understanding of the opponent’s perspective. In the early years of my career in analysis, I was fortunate to have partners such as John Clark (Air Force) and John Hines (Army) with whom I co-authored numerous studies that tied the “beans to the bacon.” Together with our British colleagues—led by Christopher Donnelly—we were able to persuade blue-side operators (NATO) to attack the Soviet plans rather than focus on tactical-level issues such as the number of divisions and aircraft the enemy had deployed.¹¹ This experience needs to be replicated by avoiding getting trapped in an action–reaction cycle in our attempts to constrain contemporary Russian plans. For example, Putin’s threat to invade Ukraine unless the West rolls back the integration of East European states into European institutions needs to focus less on protecting the status quo and more on aggravating the problems Putin is trying to deal with. Since Putin doesn’t want his people to see economic success across the border in Ukraine, the West needs to seek out means by which to make the economic gap between Ukrainians and Russians even greater. The starting place must be by cutting off all Russia’s energy sales to Europe, and this will require creativity among Western states to find ways to subsidize energy in Europe. It will be challenging, but far less costly than fighting a kinetic war in Europe. Russia cannot resolve a boycott of its energy with military force; it cannot compel European states to purchase its energy with tanks.

In the post-Soviet era we are, understandably, confronted with a much altered political and technological environment. The hope that liberal democracy would rapidly spread around the globe fell victim to greed and corruption in the liberal democracies,¹² and the information revolution turned out to drive the information ecosystem towards “polarizing and misleading content”¹³ giving authoritarian foreign states and domestic authoritarian personalities new opportunities to drag the American republic (as well as European democracies) back into a more primitive socio-economic past. Not all political analysts, however, see the current populist movements generated by the widespread decline in upward mobility and the resulting cultural erosion in the working-class and lower-middle-class hit hard by globalization leading to an era of authoritarianism. Al-

it is incumbent to familiarize oneself with his ideas about what successful strategic assessment involves. For a quick introduction to the subject, see Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” *Parameters*, Spring 2006, pp. 90–100; one might also take a look at *Net Assessment and Military Strategy: Retrospective and Prospective Essays*, edited by Thomas G. Mahnken, Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, which has a foreword authored by Mr. Marshall himself.

11 In no way am I denigrating the importance of Order of Battle work, as it must be the foundation of capability assessments concerning the opponent’s *ability* to execute plans. And today there are a number of individuals and organizations producing superb OB studies at the unclassified level.

12 While much has been written about Afghan corruption contributing to the August 2021 collapse of nation-building in Afghanistan, Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and United States Deputy Secretary of State under George W. Bush, made clear the American contribution to corruption undermining liberal democracy. During a recent interview Armitage noted that “the whole world had witnessed a conga line of grifters in the [Trump] administration that paraded as Cabinet officers. Nobody knew better than our foreign friends what these folks were about. So that raised questions, first of all, about where the direction of the United States was.” “Richard Armitage Says Starting In 2002, The U.S. Could Have Left Afghanistan,” National Public Radio, August 23, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/08/23/1030223429/richard-armitage-says-starting-in-2002-the-u-s-could-have-left-afghanistan>.

13 Cristiano Lima, “Study: Sites that mislead get record attention on Facebook,” *The Washington Post*, August 25, 2021, p. A18.

though Joel Kotkin, for example, predicts a coming neo-feudalism he envisions it not as portrayed by George Orwell in 1984 or by Margaret Atwood in *The Handmaid's Tale*, but more like Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. Huxley's *New World* consisted of five artificially bio-engineered classes kept narcotically-compliant outside of a family structure, and Kotkin perceives this future in Mark Zuckerberg's description of his ideal Facebook employees: "We may not own a car. We may not have a family. Simplicity in life is what allows you to focus on what's important."¹⁴

Since fascist systems never seem to outlive their original leaders—ignoring the fact that both the Hitler and Mussolini regimes were pounded-down from the outside—Kotkin might be correct about where the future is leading but, at the very least, he too quickly dismisses the possibility of an Orwell/Atwood interregnum stage. On most everything else, I tend to agree with Kotkin's assessment, starting with his observation of the critical role played by land-ownership in creating the middle-class foundation of democracies:

*(...) today a new generation, in the United States and much of the high-income world, faces diminishing prospects of owning land or advancing into a comfortable middle-class life. Instead of a progressive, woke, egalitarian age, we may be entering an era that is more feudal in its economic and social structure.*¹⁵

Observation of the recent past also makes it difficult to challenge Kotkin's prescription for avoiding a mass insurrection in the making:

*Democratic capitalist societies need to offer the prospect of a brighter future for the majority. Without this belief, more demands for a populist strongman or a radical redistribution of wealth seems inevitable. A form of "oligarchic socialism," with subsidies or stipends for working people might stave off destitution while allowing the wealthiest to maintain their dominance. But the issue boils down to whether people—not just those with elite credentials and skills—actually matter in a technological age. Wendell Berry, the Kentucky-based poet and novelist, observed that the "great question" hovering over society is "what are people for?" By putting an "absolute premium on labor-saving measures," we may be creating more dependence on the state while undermining the dignity of those who want to do useful work.*¹⁶

As noted in Chapter 3 of this volume, Artificial Intelligence (AI) not only threatens the entire concept of work and humanity's relationship to it, but will become weapons of first resort in war and, more broadly, every-day instruments in the pursuit of power.

Kotkin argues that "a civilization can survive only if its members, especially those with the greatest influence, believe in its basic values."¹⁷ Given the cultural deconstruction

¹⁴ As quoted in Joel Kotkin, *The Coming of Neo Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class*, New York: Encounter Books, 2020, p. 49.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

taking place in Europe and the United States, vast numbers of their citizens are becoming ignorant of the foundational principles of democracy. The United States, in particular, is confronted with a zero-sum domestic politics in which social peace is being held hostage to the will of one-third of the population that wants to impose its fundamentalist religious and bigoted racial beliefs on the nation. For the most part, this one-third of the population can be described as either authoritarian dominators or authoritarian followers—and have absolutely no interest in genuine democracy (referred to in this volume as liberal democracy).¹⁸ They, in turn, are manipulated by an ever-growing-smaller percentage of the population controlling the wealth of the United States who have already bought their own politicians: some of which are prostitutes and other are just plain stupid people (examples of both types are easily identified in the United States Congress—nothing new there). In reality, this wealthy minority is becoming part of a global mafia of sorts; one that has far more in common with its members than the people of the country in which they made or stole their wealth.¹⁹ The Russian mafia state is focused on stimulating, if not provoking, this political polarization, and will be able to do so to good effect so long as America remains committed to preventing majority rule. As is noted in Chapter 4, however, proximity made London preferable over New York City and the state of Florida as a location for Russian oligarchs wishing to stash their families abroad.

To those who have and those who will question why so much type is devoted in this volume to domestic—particularly American—politics in a volume examining Russian New Generation Warfare (NGW), I offer the Russian perspective that that is where the struggle will be won or lost. The contributors to this volume agree that the United States is the indispensable leader of the liberal democracies—despite the fact that America is not a liberal democracy. The first battle in this struggle against Russian illiberal democracy is the expansion of liberal democracy in the places that it already exists or at least has a foothold. Nowhere is this more important than in the United States, and this is the reason for a sense of urgency for publishing this volume. Trump Cult Republicans are preparing a political

¹⁸ Were Thomas Paine alive today, he probably would re-apply his term “sunshine patriots” since they only support cardboard cutout caricatures of “liberty” and “freedom”—the symbols my brother and I observed during the small town Fourth of July parades growing up in Ludington, Michigan as opposed to the quite individual scenes related to sacrifice for the genuine principles one can observe on a pleasant summer day walking through Arlington National Cemetery. I will always treasure the memory of watching my brother, Emmett, notice a woman in distress and taking time to help a mother find her son’s grave in the cemetery’s vast expanse of white crosses. That mother knew more about freedom and liberty than any Michigan Militia wannabe-soldier January 6th Insurrectionist ever will.

¹⁹ The merging of the interests of the globe’s wealthy and their collective efforts to hide their wealth from law enforcement and the taxman can be seen in how the United States has become one of the perceived safest places to stash funds. See Debbie Cenziper and Will Fitzgibbon, “Pandora Papers: A Global Investigation – ‘Cowboy Cocktail’: The Recipe that Made Wyoming a Top Tax Haven,” *The Washington Post*, December 21, 2021, pp. A1, A6, and A7. “In the U.S., regulators and prosecutors steadily have warned that money launderers located both at home and abroad target U.S. real estate transactions because they are a relatively effective and anonymous means of ‘cleaning’ dirty money.” Peter D. Hardy, Terence M. Grugan, Priya Roy and Mary K. Crutcher, “The Intersection of Money Laundering and Real Estate,” *Anti-Money Laundering 2020*, London: Global Legal Group, https://www.ballardspahr.com/-/media/files/articles/aml20_chapter-2_ballardspahr.pdf. This volume will argue that money-laundering in the United States real estate market is the nexus of the Vladimir Putin–Donald Trump relationship.

coup for the 2024 Presidential Election, and organizing weak-minded retired military leaders²⁰ in an attempt to split the American Armed Forces in support this planned coup.

The potential for a total breakdown of the chain of command along partisan lines—from the top of the chain to squad level—is significant should another insurrection occur. The idea of rogue units organizing among themselves to support the “rightful” commander in chief cannot be dismissed.

Imagine competing commanders in chief—a newly reelected Biden giving orders vs. Trump (or another Trumpian figure) issuing orders as the head of a shadow government. Worse, imagine politicians at the state and federal levels illegally installing a losing candidate as president.²¹

And we shouldn't limit our concerns to a political coup by the Radical Right Trump Cult. If a Democratic candidate for president should win the popular vote by 12 million but lose the Electoral College vote—even if it were not disrupted by Trump Cult shenanigans such as having state legislatures overruling their popular vote to name their own Electors—it should not be considered unreasonable, having experienced the unprincipled behavior of the Republican leadership in Congress such as Mitch McConnell, if the popular American majority simply refused to accept the results and shut down the country. In three years the peoples of the United States and the world should expect to be confronted by a political crisis that will not allow them to stand on the sidelines hoping the crisis will not lead to a civil war in a nuclear-armed state. If you want to understand the emerging crisis and help prevent it from metastasizing, then read this book.

Unfortunately, the empathic personality of President Joe Biden and the judicious nature of his Attorney General Merrick Garland are not well suited to the greatest sedition since President Abraham Lincoln occupied the White House. What is called for is someone with the fortitude to preserve the Union—something like what has been demonstrated by Republican Congresswoman Liz Cheney, who is at least suggesting charges be filed against Trump and others who inspired the January 6th Insurrection. People that claim that Biden stole the election through fraud need to be charged with

20 “A group of 124 retired military officials, under the name ‘Flag Officers 4 America,’ released a letter echoing Donald Trump’s false attacks on the legitimacy of [American] elections.” Paul D. Eaton, Antonio M. Taguba, and Steven M. Anderson, “The military must prepare for a 2024 insurrection,” *The Washington Post*, December 21, 2021, p. A19.

21 *Ibid.* The reader should be reminded that such shenanigans would not be novel. In 1876, for example, Congress decided to name Rutherford B. Hayes President even though his opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, won both the popular vote as well as more Electoral College votes. This volume will make the argument at a number of points and in a number of ways that a significant number of American politicians have already committed sedition and, unless they are prosecuted, their treasonous behavior should be expected to grow ever more sinister. Given that political instability is one of the goals of Russia’s New Generation Warfare, both Moscow and its American seditionist co-conspirators should be reminded not to overlook the fact that the United States Armed forces possess nuclear weapons. Envision a future historian telling the story about how Vladimir Putin had been so successful with his strategy of *decomposition* (a concept explained and discussed in Chapter 4) against the United States that a rogue American military unit had launched several nuclear warheads at Saint Petersburg and Moscow, and that is how Kazan became the capital of a new Eurasian Federation and Tatars came once again to rule the eastern Slavs.

sedition and be required to prove their claims before a jury of their peers—if they fail, let it be prison—starting with Donald Trump, himself. Such an effort would be challenging given that the Radical Right has captured much of the judiciary and other ostensibly neutral institutions, but nothing good will come from either doing nothing as treason unfolds or of ignoring the fact that the Republican Party has already packed the courts with radical and sometimes anti-democratic judges.²² This volume describes this rising threat, as well as explains the Russian role in promoting it.

None of the discussion of the non-kinetic threat in this volume is to denigrate nor downplay the more traditional kinetic or nuclear threats, but no matter how well the liberal democracies prepare for and conduct kinetic operations they will be out-manuevered by non-kinetic operations if they don't understand that Russian non-kinetic aggression is already actively undermining human rights, the rule of law, and the ability of majorities to influence how they are governed. The conservative commentator George F. Will likes to cite “Thomas Jefferson’s warnings against large undertakings based on ‘slender majorities,’” so I think that he would agree large undertakings based on minorities are even more preposterous. The liberty and freedom of minorities—even be they white and Christian—cannot be obtained at the expense of denying the same to majorities.

The greed and corruption that makes liberal democracies vulnerable to Russian NGW is exposed in this volume. The central focus in this regard is on England and the United States because these are the two most significant pressure points in the Western coalition. Russian mobilized minorities in these two countries, in particular, insist on the right to defy the majority such that chaos will permit Russian kinetic means to predominate. It is a strategy for the minority or the weak to conquer the majority or the strong. If the purpose were not so malign, it would almost seem elegant. This volume connects the dots that so many refuse to recognize, or at least are prohibited from acknowledging. If majorities in the United States and the liberal democracies are denied political equality and social justice so that Vladimir Putin may undermine support for collective defense of international legal norms—as was done during the Trump Administration—then no amount of kinetic warfare capabilities will be sufficient to bring strategic stability and security to the liberal democracies.²³ Donald Trump, himself, has admitted that Democratic Party-supported efforts to make it easier for Americans to vote will make it harder for the Republican Party to win elections²⁴—hence, the Republican Party’s effort to deny

²² Perry Back, Jr. “Where the most dangerous judges actually are,” *The Washington Post*, December 23, 2021, p. A21.

²³ Trump Cult Republicans like to point to geographic maps of the United States and point to the overwhelming red depicting the electoral districts that voted for Trump or for Republican Representatives and Senators. However, such maps do not represent *people*—that is, voters. The fact that these folks choose to ignore is that a majority of voters chose the Democratic Party candidate for president, and an overwhelming number of voters selected Democratic Candidates for the House of Representatives and the Senate. Only gerrymandering and a Federal system that is skewed in favor of small population-wise states prevented rule by the majority party—the Democrats.

²⁴ Gino Spocchia, “Trump says Republicans would never win elections again if it was easier to vote,” *Independent*, 31 March 2020, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-election-voting-republicans-us-2020-a9437881.html>; to her Trump in his own words, see “Trump admits On Air if voting was easier, Republicans would never win,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_r6qXQ5Fnk.

American citizens the ability to vote (all in the name of “election security”, of course). Chapter 5 documents the American Radical Right’s initiative to undermine democracy by suppressing voting rights.

When contributor Polish Colonel (ret.) Miroslaw Banasik read the entire initial draft of this volume, he commented that it was crucial to read the entire book prior to making any judgment about it. I asked my friend “Mirek” to provide me with a written explanation of what he meant, and he responded with the following text that I include for its clarifying cognitive effect:

The structure of the monograph is designed so that the reader is provided with basic empirical knowledge of regional security determinants. The monograph also presents the dependencies of international interactions in systemic, functional and structural terms that have been studied in the past and present, which constitutes the epistemological value of the publication. Based on this framework, it is possible to identify phenomena, mechanisms and regularities that will accompany the future.

It is important to emphasize that the accumulated knowledge is presented in a holistic manner. However, one should not succumb to the suggestion that individual chapters can be treated separately. To understand the real intentions of the Russian Federation and the ways of their implementation in the strategic dimension it is necessary to read the whole publication. Then, too, one can learn the logic of the content presented by the authors.

*Phillip A. Petersen, Ph.D.
15 February 2022*

Wstęp

ŁUKASZ PRZYBYŁO

Po przeczytaniu książki Phillipa A. Petersena przypomniał mi się długi telegram Kennana z Moskwy, w którym amerykański dyplomata pisał do prezydenta Trumana:

[rosyjscy władcy] obawiali się, co by się stało, gdyby Rosjanie dowiedzieli się prawdy o świecie poza granicami, a cudzoziemcy prawdy o świecie Rosjan. Rosyjscy przywódcy nauczyli się więc szukać poczucia bezpieczeństwa tylko w cierpliwej, ale śmiertelnej walce o całkowite zniszczenie konkurencyjnej potęgi, ale nigdy w zawieranych z nią umowach i kompromisach¹.

Nie ma znaczenia czy w Rosji panuje car, Politbiuro, czy Putin – cele imperium się nie zmieniają, choć otoczka ideologiczna tak. Polacy, a także byli mieszkańcy demoludów i republik sowieckich w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, są specjalnie wyczuleni na rosyjską politykę zmierzającą do ponownego uzależnienia i zniewolenia naszych krajów postrzeganych jako „strefa bezpieczeństwa”, a nie suwerenne państwa. Przez dekady, nieufne podejście do Rosji, uważane było za fobię nie znajdującą uzasadnienia w faktach. Podejście takie miała nie tylko Europa Zachodnia ale i USA ogłaszające kolejne resety i szukające jakiegoś *modus vivendi* z Rosjanami.

Dopiero agresja na Ukrainę w latach 2014–2015 otworzyła (choć cały czas nie w pełni) oczy Zachodowi. Morderstwa dysydentów, wojna informacyjna z Zachodem (Brexit, Katalonia, wybory w USA, itd.), wspieranie wszelkich ruchów mających niszczyć nasze społeczeństwa od środka, zbrodnie wojenne i terror na Krymie oraz w zajętej części Ukrainy – wszystko to wzbudza tylko ograniczoną reakcję USA, NATO i UE. A przecież:

[Władza sowiecka] nie postępuje według ustalonych planów. Nie ryzykuje, jeśli nie jest to konieczne. Jest odporna na logikę rozumu, ale bardzo wrażliwa na logikę siły. Z tego powodu może z łatwością się cofnąć – i tak zazwyczaj robi, jeśli napotka

¹ Bartosz Bieliszczyk, Joanna Bieliszczyk, „Długi telegram” George’a Kennana, Sprawy Międzynarodowe 2020, t. 73, nr 2, s. 205–224. Oryginalny dokument można zobaczyć na stronie Wilson Centre, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178>.

silny opór. Zatem jeśli przeciwnik ma wystarczającą siłę i jasno pokazuje gotowość jej użycia, rzadko musi się do niej uciec².

Nadzieja Zachodu na ułożenie się z Rosją, wciągnięcie ją w demokratyczne, międzynarodowe struktury, ucywilizowanie, spełżyły na niczym. Rosjanom udało się natomiast skorumpowanie elit europejskich, czego najlepszym przykładem są Gerhard Schröder, Marie Le Pen, François Fillon³, czy szefowa austriackiego MSZ Karin Kneissl na której ślub jako gość przybył Putin razem z chórem Kozaków⁴. Czym innym niż korupcją i głupotą tłumaczyć można traktowanie Rosji, której obroty handlowe z Niemcami w pierwszych trzech kwartałach 2021 r. są trzy razy mniejsze od Polski, jako poważnego partnera ekonomicznego⁵? Chyba że elity europejskie liczą na stworzenie z Rosji kolonii surowcowej? To by była jednak skrajna naiwność. „Stacja benzynowa posiadająca broń atomową” nigdy na to nie pójdzie.

Kilka dekad „znieczulania” przyniosło swoje efekty, dopiero od niedawna Federacja Rosyjska znów postrzegana jest w swojej prawdziwej postaci – brutalnego imperium, kierującego się swoją odmianą racjonalności niekompatybilną z liberalną demokracją. Wieloletnie inwestycje w siły zbrojne i narzędzia wojny informacyjnej uczyniły z Rosji, po raz kolejny na przestrzeni wieków, groźnego przeciwnika. Wydaje się, że jest to jednak ostatni przybór fali, ponieważ taki poziom zbrojeń jest nie do utrzymania w perspektywie zmiany paradygmatu energetycznego, który w perspektywie dekady lub dwóch całkowicie zmieni świat. Na pewno zaś zmieni Rosję z jej uzależnieniem od eksportu ropy i gazu. Oczywiście kraj ten może się zmienić i przyjąć te wartości, które dzisiaj hołubi tylko mała część społeczeństwa rosyjskiego – oznaczałoby to jednak krach kleptokracji rządzącej dziś Federacją Rosyjską. Nie byłby to proces bezbolesny – czego obawiają się wszyscy sąsiedzi Rosji. Wydaje się jednak, że trzeba oddzielić rosyjską oligarchię od społeczeństwa, bo:

[Rosjanie] w większości są przyjaźnie nastawieni do świata zewnętrznego, który chętnie by poznali, są też chętni sprawdzić w tym świecie swoje talenty, ale przede wszystkim chcą żyć w pokoju i cieszyć się z owoców własnej pracy⁶.

Wydaje się że w tym trudnym momencie dziejowym, kiedy „czasy znów stały się ciekawe” najważniejsze dla Polski i państw naszego regionu przetrwanie rosyjskiego wzmoczenia imperialnego poprzez budowanie odstraszenia militarnego i zacieśniania

² *Ibid.*

³ Thibault Spirlet, “Former French PM Fillon joins board of Russian petrochemical giant,” *Politico*, 24.12.2021, <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-francois-fillon-sibur-board-job-russia-petrochemical/>.

⁴ Austria przejmowała wtedy od Bułgarii prezydencję w Radzie UE i zamierzała pośredniczyć między Moskwą i Kijowem w sprawie konfliktu na wschodniej Ukrainie. Takie podejście szefowej austriackiego MSZ nie wróżyło dobrze Ukrainie.

⁵ Wg danych niemieckiego Federalnego Biura statystycznego (destatis.de) w 2020 r. obroty handlowe Polski Niemcami były 2,8 razy większe niż Niemiec z Federacją Rosyjską (123,5 w porównaniu do 44,6 mld euro) – trend ten jest podobny w pierwszych trzech kwartałach 2021 r. Zsumowane obroty handlowe naszego regionu (Polska, Czechy, Słowacja, Węgry, Rumunia, Bułgaria i kraje bałtyckie) z Niemcami były w 2020 r. 7,7 razy większe niż z Federacją Rosyjską (343 w porównaniu do 44,6 mld euro).

⁶ Bielińczuk, Bielińczuk, *op. cit.*, s. 212.

więzów gospodarczo-politycznych z Zachodem. Ze względu na swój potencjał ekonomiczny i militarny Stany Zjednoczone są i będą liderem wolnego świata – naszym kluczowym sojusznikiem.

Nowa Generacja Wojny, której genezę i główne założenia przedstawiono w niniejszym opracowaniu, jest dla świata euroatlantyckiego niezwykle groźna, bo żeruje na słabościach społeczeństwa demokratycznego zwielokrotnionych przez rewolucję informacyjną i internet. Wydaje się jednak, że demokracja, która przeszła już kilka prób dziejowych, może i powinna stanąć do walki o swoje wartości. Jednak w pierwszej kolejności trzeba zrozumieć strategię przeciwnika, a potem pokonać ją własną. Dlatego książka Phillipa A. Petersena jasno pokazująca mechanizmy jakich używa Putin i Federacja Rosyjska do walki z Zachodem, jest tak ważna. Uświadomienie sobie zagrożenia i jego kształtu może umożliwić politykom, społeczeństwom i narodom podejmowanie właściwych decyzji i obronę przed rosyjską agresją na nasze wartości, wolność i przyszłość naszych dzieci.

Łukasz Przybyło, Ph.D.

Introduction

ŁUKASZ PRZYBYŁO

After reading Phillip A. Petersen's book, I was reminded of Kennan's famous long telegram from Moscow in which the American diplomat wrote to President Truman:

[the Russian rulers] have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct conduct between western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about the world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It does not matter whether Russia is ruled by a tsar, Politburo, or Putin—the goals of the empire do not change, although the ideological envelope does. Poles, as well as former residents of communist countries and Soviet republics in Central and Eastern Europe, are especially sensitive to the Russian policy aimed at making us again dependent and enslaved, with our states perceived as a “security zone”—not sovereign entities. For decades, a distrustful attitude towards Russia has been considered an unjustified phobia. Such an approach was taken not only by Western Europe but also by the USA announcing further resets and looking for some *modus vivendi* with the Russians.

Only the aggression against Ukraine in 2014–2015 opened the eyes of the West (though not fully). The murders of dissidents, information warfare with the West (Brexit, Catalonia, US elections, etc.), supporting all movements aimed at destroying our societies from the inside, war crimes and terror in Crimea as well as in the occupied part of Ukraine—all this arouses only a limited response from the US, NATO, and the EU. But:

[The Soviet power] does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.

The hope of the West to come to terms with Russia, to involve it in democratic,

international structures, to civilize it, has failed. The Russians, on the other hand, managed to corrupt the European elite, the best examples of which are Gerhard Schröder, Marie Le Pen, François Fillon, or the head of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Karin Kneissl, at whose wedding Putin came as a guest with a choir of Cossacks. What other than corruption and stupidity can explain the treatment of Russia as a serious economic partner? Its trade turnover with Germany in the first three quarters of 2021 was three times smaller than Poland's. Unless the European elite is dreaming of creating a resource colony from Russia? However, that would be an extreme naivety. Russia—"a gas station with nuclear weapons" would never go for that.

Several decades of "anesthesia" have brought their effects, only recently has the Russian Federation been once again perceived in its true form—a brutal empire, guided by its kind of rationality incompatible with liberal democracy. Many years of investment in the armed forces and information warfare tools have made Russia, once again over the centuries, a formidable enemy. However, this seems to be the last possible effort, as such a level of defense spending is unsustainable with the prospect of an energy paradigm shift that will completely change the world in a decade or two. And it will change Russia with its dependence on oil and gas exports. Of course, this country may change and adopt the values that today only a small part of Russian society cherishes—but this would mean the collapse of the kleptocracy that rules the Russian Federation today. It would not be a painless process—which is what all Russia's neighbors are afraid of. It seems, however, that the Russian oligarchy needs to be separated from society because:

[Russians] are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor.

It seems that at this difficult historical moment, when "times have become interesting again," the most important thing for Poland and the countries of our region is to survive the Russian imperial frenzy by building military deterrence and tightening economic and political ties with the West. Due to its economic and military potential, the United States is and will be the leader of the free world—our key ally.

The New Generation of War, whose genesis and main assumptions are presented in this study, is extremely dangerous for the Euro-Atlantic world because it preys on the weaknesses of a democratic society multiplied by the information revolution of the Internet. It seems, however, that a democracy that has already undergone several historical trials can and should stand up to fight for its values. However, to be effective, one first needs to understand the opponent's strategy and then defeat it with one's own. That is why Phillip A. Petersen's book, clearly showing the mechanisms that Putin and the Russian Federation use to fight the West, is so important. Being aware of the threat and its shape may enable politicians, societies, and nations to make the right decisions and defend themselves against Russian aggression on our values, freedom, and the future of our children.

Łukasz Przybyło, Ph.D.

Prefață

SILVIU NATE

Pentru statele aflate pe frontiera estică a NATO, agresiunea Rusiei sub diverse forme reprezintă o realitate cotidiană. Sunt destul de rare ocaziile când analiști occidentali surprind esența provocărilor strategice din Marea Baltică și Marea Neagră. Phillip Petersen este exponentul acestui culoar distinct de expertiză care ne oferă o înțelegere comprehensivă nu doar asupra fenomenului în sine, ci datorită evaluării analitice de tip net assessment oferă celorlalți contribuitori oportunitatea de a furniza opțiuni de securizare.

În loc să se alătore curentului principal al evoluției socio-economice și politice europene după prăbușirea Uniunii Sovietice din 1991, Moscova a ales să se întoarcă la paradigma imperială rusă pre-sovietică. Drept urmare, Moscova a continuat să se situeze în opoziție cu implicarea americană în Europa și s-a opus promovării valorilor democratice liberale de către Uniunea Europeană.

Doctrinile ofensive bazate pe ideologia și valorile feudale al Kremlinului ne-au aruncat într-un război cognitiv cu efecte implacabile în plan socio-cultural asupra politicii, care au condus prin exploatarea ecosistemelor informaționale și operații de influență la polarizare socială și accentuarea extremelor politice în lumea occidentală. Instrumentele cognitive și non-cinetice utilizate de Rusia au împins vecinătatea comună către veritabile zone gri – împânzită de state cărora Moscova le-a generat conflicte sub false pretexte, dar atentează în același timp la stabilitatea și valorile fundamentale ale membrilor Alianței.

Deși preocupările pentru analiza mediului de securitate al Mării Negre au fost periferice sau marginale pentru multă vreme în spațiul de reflecție occidental, complexitatea tendințelor de distribuire a puterii la Marea Neagră indică rolul critic și indispensabil al acestui nod geopolitic de securitate transatlantică. Consolidarea ofensivă strategică rusă pune accent pe mutarea centrului de greutate de la nord la sud, iar realitățile geostrategice actuale sunt percepute acum de către Statul Major al Federației Ruse ca integrând Marea Neagră sub controlul Rusiei. Anexarea ilegală al Crimeii de către Rusia și utilizarea unui avanpost militar naval în Sevastopol întreține și aprovizionează conflictele din Siria și Libia, cu implicații de problematizare a securității Flancului Sudic European în Marea Mediterană, alimentând dorința mai largă a Rusiei de a accesa facil Oceanul Atlantic.

Phillip Petersen aduce o perspectivă de substanță și produce relații determinante între modelul de analiză a fenomenului operațional rusesc și Războiul de Nouă Generație al Rusiei ce reflectă influența și interpretarea Kremlinului asupra strategiei militare occidentale. Preocupările analiștilor dedicați înțelegerii organizării militare ruse, dar și preocupările noastre la Centrul de Studii Globale pentru integrarea expertizei internaționale și formularea de recomandări politice care au contribuit la creșterea prezenței aliate în Marea Neagră, se intersectează avantajos cu vocația lui Phillip Petersen pentru evaluări operaționale și experiența sa bogată în jocuri de război (wargaming). Acest demers analitic plasează autorul pe un palier distinct al expertizei americane, fiind unul dintre puținii specialiști care pătrund în esența Frontului Estic al Alianței și operaționalizează agil rolul critic pe care îl joacă Marea Baltică și Marea Neagră pentru securitatea transatlantică. Viziunea imperialistă a lui Vladimir Putin, pe fondul recuperării teritoriilor „pierdute” în urma destrămării Uniunii Sovietice, plasează Marea Neagră și Marea Baltică în centrul preocupărilor cu potențial de confruntare. Orientarea spre practicitate a cărții contextualizează evaluări strategice, lecții învățate, scenarii și opțiuni de consolidare a regiunii Marea Baltică – Marea Neagră, evidențiind rolul statelor din prima linie, respectiv România și Polonia ca centre de gravitație pentru stabilitatea Europei de Est, ce se confruntă direct cu realitatea geostrategică a frontului estic al NATO.

Sprijinul SUA în cadrul Inițiativei celor Trei Mări poate contribui semnificativ la creșterea și consolidarea infrastructurii necesare pentru îmbunătățirea mobilității militare, a desfășurărilor de urgență și a prezenței operaționale. În același timp, are rolul de a spori interdependențele economice și poate oferi randament investițiilor americane în regiune. Un angajament ferm al SUA nu va asigura doar un ascendent defensiv al statelor din prima linie a NATO, dar va crește și profilul socio-economic coercitiv al acestora în raport cu Rusia.

Marele rezultat al acestei lucrări constă în fuziunea dintre personalitatea intelectuală și experiența directă a principalului „modelator” al acestui volum colectiv, în calitatea sa de fost analist de informații al Defense Intelligence Agency, cu idei colectate de-a lungul timpului din cercetări, analize și cercuri de reflecție consacrate. Cartea oferă recomandări utile pentru viitorul Concept Strategic al Alianței și reprezintă un suport valoros pentru construcția politicilor de securitate, apărare și diplomatie publică. Capacitatea de a granula percepțiile Est-Vest pun în centrul hărții Marea Neagră – un nod geopolitic situat între: perspectivele aliate, speranțele statelor aspirante și agenda Rusiei.

Sunt convins că, după parcurgerea acestei lucrări, introducerea unui model multidisciplinar care examinează un set mult mai larg de variabile analitice și perspective decât în mod obișnuit – o abordare care reflectă în mod clar un nou tip de război – cititorul va înțelege mult mai bine amploarea confruntării în NATO și Uniunea Europeană se regăsesc angajate. Europa de Est nu este doar un flanc, este frontul unui război desfășurat la scară largă cu implicații globale care se poartă deja în profunzimea noastră colectivă, nu doar în capitalele și societățile noastre, ci în mintea fiecărui cetățean în căutarea libertății și justiției socio-economice.

Dr. Silviu Nate

*Director al Centrului de Studii Globale
Universitatea „Lucian Blaga” din Sibiu, România*

Foreword

SILVIU NATE

For NATO's eastern border states, Russia's aggression in various forms is a daily reality. It is quite rare for Western analysts to capture the essence of the strategic challenges in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Phillip Petersen is the exponent of a distinct area of expertise that gives us a comprehensive understanding not only of the phenomenon itself but also, because of his net assessment analytical approach, offers his other contributors the opportunity of providing security options.

Instead of joining the mainstream of European socio-economic and political evolution after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow chose to return to the pre-Soviet Russian imperial paradigm. As a result, Moscow found itself still in opposition to American involvement in Europe and opposed to the European Union's promotion of liberal democratic values.

The offensive doctrines based on the Kremlin's ideological and feudalist values have plunged us into a cognitive war with relentless socio-cultural impact upon politics that, through the exploitation of information ecosystems and influence operations led to social polarization and stressing of political extremes throughout the Western world. The cognitive and non-kinetic instruments used by Russia have pushed the common neighborhood to veritable gray areas—littered with states within which Moscow has generated conflicts under false pretenses, simultaneously undermining the stability and the fundamental values of Alliance members.

Although concerns for the analysis of the Black Sea security environment have been peripheral or marginal for a long time in the Western space of reflection, the complexity of power distribution trends in the Black Sea suggests both a critical and indispensable role for this geopolitical node of transatlantic security. Russia's strategic offensive consolidation focuses on shifting the center of gravity from north to south, while current geostrategic realities are now perceived by the Russian Federation's General Staff as integrating the Black Sea under Russian control. Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the use of a naval outpost in Sevastopol to maintain and supply the conflicts in Syria and Libya, having implications on the security of the European Southern Flank in the Mediterranean and fueling Russia's wider desire for easy access the Atlantic Ocean.

Phillip Petersen brings a substantial perspective and displays decisive relationships between the analytic model of the Russian operational phenomenon and Russian New Generation Warfare, which reflect the Kremlin's influence and view of Western military strategy. The concerns of analysts dedicated to understanding the Russian military structure, but also our preoccupations at the Global Studies Center for integrating international expertise and formulating policy recommendations that have contributed to increasing the allied presence in the Black Sea, intersect with Phillip Petersen's vocation for operational assessments and his rich experience in wargaming. This analytical approach places the author on a distinct level within American expertise, being one of the few specialists to penetrate the essence of the Alliance's Eastern Front and to agilely operationalize the critical role that the Baltic and the Black Seas play for broader transatlantic security. Vladimir Putin's imperialist vision, based on the recovery of "lost" territories following the collapse of the Soviet Union, places the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea at the center of concerns for potential confrontations. The book's orientation towards practicality contextualizes strategic assessments, lessons learned, scenarios, and options for consolidating the Baltic–Black Sea region, highlighting the role of frontline states, namely Romania and Poland as gravity centers for the stability of Eastern Europe, as the two of them are directly faced with the geostrategic reality of NATO's eastern front.

US support for the Three Seas Initiative can make a significant contribution to increasing and strengthening the infrastructure needed to improve military mobility, emergency deployment, and operational presence. At the same time, it has the potential to increase economic interdependence and can provide a return on US investment in the region. A strong US commitment will not only ensure a defensive ascendancy of NATO frontline states, but it will also increase their coercive socio-economic profile vis-à-vis Russia.

The great outcome of this work is the fusion between the intellectual personality and the direct experience of the principal "shaper" of this collective volume, in his capacity as a former intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, with ideas collected over time from established research, analyses, and reflection groups. The book provides useful recommendations for the Alliance's future Strategic Concept and is a valuable support for the construction of security, defense, and public diplomacy policies. The ability to granulate East-West perceptions puts the Black Sea at the center of the map—a geopolitical node between Allied perspectives, aspiring states' hopes, and Russia's agenda.

I trust that after reading this work introducing a multi-discipline model examining a far wider than normal set of analytical variables and perspectives—an approach that clearly reflects a new type of warfare—that the reader will much better understand the magnitude of the confrontation in which NATO and the European Union find themselves engaged. Eastern Europe is not just a flank, it is the front of a large-scale war with global implications already being waged in our collective depth—not just in our capitals and societies—but in the minds of each of our citizens seeking liberty and socio-economic justice.

*Dr. Silviu Nate
Director of the Global Studies Center
Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania*

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CHAPTER I

We Are At War, What's Not To Understand!

PHILLIP A. PETERSEN

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM JERZY ALEKSANDROWICZ,
MIROSŁAW BANASIK, HANS DAMEN, AND GREGORY KING MELCHER

The narrative this book lays out is, essentially, one of inconvenient truths. Contrary to the foolishness articulated by Vladimir Putin about the collapse of the Soviet Union being some sort of tragedy, the collapse has been correctly described as the result of self-inflicted “ecocide.”¹ Primitive feudalist exploiters destroyed the Soviet Union, and they are now back in power attempting to extend their destructive behavior around the globe with the assistance of White Christian Racists everywhere.² Furthermore, the resentment towards the West for the collapse of this giant prison is an equal falsehood! The truth is that the United States Government (USG)—particularly Dr. Condoleezza Rice—did everything it could to save Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration greatly feared the potential consequences of a collapse of the central government in Moscow—so much that President George H. W. Bush went to Kyiv and warned against “suicidal na-

¹ See, for example, Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., *Ecocide in the USSR*, New York: Basic-Books, 1991.

² Research conducted on the 3,517 ads by “the Russian company charged with orchestrating a wide-ranging effort to meddle in the 2016 presidential election overwhelmingly focused its efforts on what is arguably America’s rawest political division: race.” USA Today Network reporters reviewed the ads released by the American House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and found that “more than half—about 1,950—made express reference to race. Those accounted for 25 million ad impressions—a measure of how many times the spot was pulled from a server for transmission to a device. (...) The most prominent ad—with 13 million impressions and 73,000 clicks—illustrates how the influence campaign was executed.” According to Adam Schiff, the Democratic Minority Leader of the House Intelligence Committee, “These ads broadly sought to pit one American against another by exploring faults in our society or race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and other deeply cynical thoughts. (...) When you’re stoking fear to get a negative action directed at a targeted population based on race, and when a foreign nation uses that fear to subvert and undermine democracy, that’s become a serious problem,” said Derrick Johnson, president and CEO of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. According to “Bret Schafer of the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Democracy, which tracks activity of Russia-linked social media bots and trolls. (...) Social media is an effective way to target wedge issues because of the ability to micro-target ads, sending messages to confederate flag supporters at the same time as Black Lives Matter sympathizers to stoke divisions. They are stirring up the racial pot, while then trying to connect with minority groups and saying: Look at how racist the content is online. They don’t really have to do that because the content online is racist without the Russians, to be very clear, Schafer said.” Nick Penzenstadler, Brad Heath, Jessica Guynn, *USA Today*, May 11, 2018.

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